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A. T. MASSEY COAL COMPANY v. INTERNATIONAL UNION,
UNITED MINE WORKERS: BINDING PARENT
CORPORATIONS TO THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENTS OF THEIR SUBSIDIARIES
I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court in John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston' clearly
established that under certain circumstances a successor corporation may be compelled to arbitrate in accord with the terms of a collective bargaining agreement
between its predecessor and the elected representatives of its employees. In Wiley,
a publishing company entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the
plaintiff union, and then merged with John Wiley & Sons, another publishing
firm. 2 The surviving firm continued to conduct operations without substantial
change using the same employees. 3 The Supreme Court held that: "[T]he disappearance by merger of a corporate employer which has entered into a collective
bargaining agreement with a union does not automatically terminate all rights of
the employees covered ... in appropriate circumstances .... the successor employer may be required to arbitrate with the union under the agreement." ' 4 Thus,
in Wiley, a corporation which did not sign a collective bargaining agreement was
nonetheless held to be bound by its terms because of the continuity of identity
between the two employers.
Although the principle of successorship has been developed and refined by
the Supreme Court in the years since the Wiley decision, the court has not had
occasion to speak directly to the related issue of whether a corporation which is
not a signatory to a collective bargaining agreement may be bound thereby because
of its parent-subsidiary relationship with a signatory corporation. This issue, one
of first impression for the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, was presented
in the case of A. T. Massey Coal Co. v. InternationalUnion, United Mine Workers,5 in which the court held, based on general principles of agency, that the
subsidiary company was not authorized to bind its parent and other affiliates to
the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. 6 Other courts of appeal have confronted this same question in recent decisions in which they have employed at

John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
Id. at 545.
Id. at 551.
Id. at 548.
A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc. v. International Union, United Mine Workers, 799 F.2d 142
(4th Cir. 1986).
6 Id. at 147.
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least three distinct analytical approaches to the problem of determining when it
may be appropriate to bind a non-signatory corporation to the terms of a collective
bargaining agreement entered into by an affiliated corporation.
This Comment will explore the various approaches utilized by the federal
courts in resolving this issue, and discuss the decision in A. T. Massey in light of
the developing case law in this area.
II.

STATEMENT OF TH=

CASE

The A.T. Massey Coal Company and its seventy-three wholly owned subsidiary corporations are engaged in the production, purchasing, and sale of coal. 7
On occasion, the Massey companies have been represented for collective bargaining purposes by the Bituminous Coal Operators Association (BCOA).8 Prior
to the expiration of the 1981 National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement
(NBCWA), Massey and its affiliates, except for the Omar Mining Company, withdrew from the BCOA and rejected a request from the United Mine Workers of
America (UMWA) that they become signatories to a successor contract. 9 The 1984
NBCWA was negotiated and became effective on October 1, 1984, binding all
companies in the BCOA, including Omar."° Article IA(f) of the 1984 NBCWA
provides in part that "Employers agree that this Agreement covers the operation
of all the coal lands, coal producing and coal preparation facilities owned or held
under lease by them ... or by any subsidiary or affiliate at the date of this
Agreement."" Subsequently the UMWA has sought to hold Massey and a number
of its affiliated corporations to the terms of the 1984 NBCWA by virtue of their
2
relationship to Omar.'
The Massey companies brought an action in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia seeking a declaration that they were not bound
by the collective bargaining agreement which was dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.13 In a related action, the union sought a declaratory judgment
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia that
the Massey companies were bound by the 1984 BCOA, and also a preliminary
injunction requiring the Massey companies to be joined in and to arbitrate a
grievance filed by the UMWA against Omar.14 The district court determined that

' International Union, United Mine Workers v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc. No. 2:86-0014,
slip op. at 3 (S.D. W.Va. Feb. 25, 1986) [hereinafter cited as International Union].
8 A.T. Massey, 799 F.2d at 144.
9 Id.
10Id.
" National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1984 § IA(f).
12A.T. Massey, 799 F.2d at 144.
13 Id.

" InternationalUnion, No. 2:86-0014 slip op. at 5.
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Massey and its subsidiaries who were parties to the action functioned as a single
employer and that the union had therefore shown a probable right to bind them
to the contract." Judge Knapp went on to hold that "[w]hether or not the defendant companies are all 'subsidiaries or affiliates' of Omar within the meaning of
Article IA(f) ... is a matter which can only be determined under the grievance
and arbitration procedure of the 1984 Agreement" and entered an injunction
6
directing Massey and the other defendants to arbitrate this issue.'
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit consolidated these two cases
for purposes of appeal. Circuit Judge Murnaghan, writing for the majority, held
that the Virginia case had been properly dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction because section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act 7 does
not confer jurisdiction when the plaintiff fails to "allege breach of an existing
collective bargaining contract." 8 With respect to the West Virginia case, the court
held that whether an agreement to arbitrate existed between the Massey companies
and the union was to be determined by the court, not by an arbitrator. 9 Finding
that the question of whether Massey and its affiliates, other than Omar, had
agreed to arbitrate was ripe for resolution, the court went on to hold, based upon
ordinary agency principles that "there is no obligation on the part of Massey and
its affiliates, other than Omar, to negotiate as a consequence of the provisions
of the 1984 NBCWA. ' 20 In reaching this determination, the court rejected the
proposition that the "single employer" doctrine developed by the National Labor
Relations Board would control the determination of whether Omar "was empowered to act as an agent authorized to bind its parent and affiliates to an
agreement to arbitrate.' ' 2 Circuit Judge Hall concurred with the majority's holdings except insofar as the court reached the ultimate issue of the existence of an
agreement to arbitrate, indicating that this question should properly be resolved
in the first instance by the district court.22
III.
A.

PRioR

LAW

Arbitrability-A Question for Judicial Determination

In the recent case of AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers,'
the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the long-standing principle that "the

Is Id. at 9.
,6 Id. at

10.

,7 Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, § 301, 29 U.S.C. 185 (1982).
A.T. Massey, 799 F.2d at 146.
"Id.
20 Id. at 147.
21 Id.
" Id. (Hall, J., concurring in part).
13 AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers, 106 S. Ct. 1415 (1986).
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question of arbitrability-whether a collective-bargaining agreement creates a duty
for the parties to arbitrate the particular grievance-is undeniably an issue for
judicial determination" unless the parties clearly provide otherwise. 24 This follows
from the rule established by the Supreme Court in Steelworkers v. Warrior &
Gulf Navigation Company25 that "arbitration is a matter of contract and a party
cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed
so to submit." ' 26 In the successorship case, John Wiley & Sons, the court expressly
reiterated that "whether or not the company was bound to arbitrate, as well as
what issues it must arbitrate, is a matter to be determined by the Court on the
basis of the contract entered into by the parties." 27
B. Holding a Non-Signatory Corporation to the Collective Bargaining
Agreement through its Relationship with a Signatory Corporation
1. Piercing the Corporate Veil
The question of whether it is proper to bind a non-signatory corporation to
a collective bargaining agreement on the basis of its relationship to a signatory
corporation has been approached by two courts of appeal primarily in terms of
piercing the corporate veil. The First Circuit articulated this approach in United
Paperworkers v. T.P. Property Corp.2 8 in which the Paperworkers Union
brought suit seeking to compel Penntech Papers, Incorporated, which through its
subsidiary, T.P. Property Corporation, had purchased the outstanding stock of
the Kennebec River Pulp and Paper Company, to arbitrate concerning certain
provisions of a collective bargaining agreement entered into by Kennebec and the
union which neither Penntech nor T.P. Property had signed. 29 The district court
denied the union's motion to compel arbitration and, on appeal, the court of
appeals affirmed, holding that there was no basis for ordering Penntech to arbitrate with the union. 30 The district court had framed the issue before it not in
terms of successorship, but as "whether parent corporations should be bound to
the collective bargaining agreements of their subsidiaries," and the court of appeals agreed that this was the proper formulation of the issue insofar as a "question of successorship does not arise every time there is a shift in the controlling
interest of stock in a corporation."'"

Id. at 1418.
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
Id. at 582.
" John Wiley & Sons, 376 U.S. at 547 (quoting Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S.

238, 241 (1962)).
" United Paperworkers International Union v. T. P.
Property Corp., 583 F.2d 33 (1st Cir.
1978).
id. at 34.
Id at 35.
31 Id.
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In reaching its holding, the court of appeals stressed that even though the
management of the three companies was "so intertwined as to be indistinguishable" this was not sufficient grounds for the court to pierce the corporate veil
and hold Penntech to the agreement in the absence of special circumstances such
as fraud or misrepresentation on the part of Penntech which induced the union
to enter the agreement; diversion of Kennebec's income or assets to Penntech;
mismanagement by Penntech causing Kennbec to fail; or a representation by Penntech that it would meet the terms of the agreement if Kennebec were unable to
do so. 32 Given these facts, the court of appeals stated that an order compelling
Penntech to arbitrate could be based only "on a policy that a holding parent
corporation should be bound to the arbitration agreement of its subsidiary whenever it controls its subsidiary's stock and participates in its management ....
No such policy has yet been adopted by Congress or the courts." 33
The Third Circuit has also indicated that corporate veil piercing is a sound
framework for analysis of the propriety of binding a non-signatory company to
a collective bargaining agreement when an affiliate affiliated company did sign
the agreement. In the case of American Bell Inc. v. Federation of Telephone
Workers,3 4 the court was presented with a complex factual situation which arose
when one subsidiary of AT&T, Bell Telephone Company of Pennsylvania, transferred certain assets and employees to another AT&T subsidiary, American Bell,
Inc. (ABI)28 ABI brought suit seeking a declaratory judgment that it was not
required to arbitrate "disputes about its employment practices" under the collective bargaining agreement between Bell of Pennsylvania and the union "on the
basis of Bell's transfer of assets."' ' The district court denied the request for
declaratory judgment and dismissed the case; on appeal the Third Circuit remanded for clarification of the lower court's factual and legal findings, after
37
discussing the applicability of the piercing the corporate veil theory to the case.
The Third Circuit stressed that although it might, in unusual circumstances,
be appropriate to pierce the corporate veil in order to hold a non-signatory corporation to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, the existence of a
8
parent-subsidiary relationship alone does not constitute sufficient justification.
Noting that the requirements for disregarding corporate form are sometimes imprecisely formulated, the court found that they were still demanding them, and
that piercing the veil was appropriate only " 'to prevent fraud, illegality, or injustice, or when recognition of the corporate entity would defeat public policy

32 Id.

Id. at 35-36.
American Bell Inc. v. Federation of Telephone Workers, 736 F.2d 879 (3rd Cir. 1984).
-,1
Id. at 882-83.
16 Id. at 884.
17 Id. at 887.
38Id.
"

14
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or shield someone from liability for a crime.' "9 The Third Circuit concluded
its discussion of corporate veil-piercing as a means of binding a non-signatory to
a collective bargaining agreement by concurring with the First Circuit that "there
is no policy of federal labor law, either legislative or judge-made, that a parent
corporation is bound by its subsidiary's labor contracts simply because it controls
the subsidiary's stock and participates in the subsidiary's management." 40
2. The Single Employer Doctrine
Federal courts also have analyzed the issue of whether a non-signatory corporation, under some circumstances, may be held to the terms of a collective
bargaining agreement by virtue of its relationship to a signatory party in terms
of whether the two entities, signatory and non-signatory, constitute a "single
employer". The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed
4' holding that
this issue in CarpentersLocal Union No. 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth,
the single employer analysis developed by the National Labor Relations Board
could be employed by a federal court in deciding a suit for breach of a collective
bargaining agreement. 42 Furthermore, the court would have jurisdiction to address
both aspects of the single employer issue: whether two (or more) employers should
be treated as one, and whether
the employees of both constituted a single ap43
propriate bargaining- unit.
The National Labor Relations Board utilizes the single employer doctrine which
"allows it to treat two or more related enterprises as one employer" for both
jurisdictional purposes and in the context of unfair labor practices cases. 44 The
Board considers four factors, no one of which is controlling, in determining the
existence of single employer status: "(1) interrelation of operations, (2) common
management, (3) centralized control of labor relations, and (4) common ownership. ' 45 An initial finding of single employer status does not mean that "all
the subentities comprising the single employer will be held bound by a contract
signed by only one"; a further finding that the employees of the several entities
constitute a single approximate bargaining unit is necessary." The two steps of
the analysis are governed by distinct considerations: "under the single employer
doctrine, the focus is the interrelatedness of the employers, while in assessing an
appropriate bargaining unit, the focus is on the similarity of concerns between

11Id. at 886 (quoting Zubik v. Zubik, 384 F.2d 267, 272 (3rd Cir. 1976)).
40Id. at 887.

4 Carpenters Local Union No. 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, 690 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1982), reh'g
denied, 696 F.2d 996 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 932 (1983).
,2Id. at 519.
43Id.

" Id. at 504.
45
4

Id.
Id. at 505.
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employees. ' 47 The Fifth Circuit decided that both questions were subject to judicial determination when essential
to the resolution of a claim of breach of a
4
collective bargaining agreement.
The holding of the Fifth Circuit that appropriateness of the bargaining unit
may be judicially determined is of special interest, because the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided precisely the same question two days
earlier in Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local No. 70 v. California Consolidators,
Inc. 49 and reached the opposite conclusion. In this case, the union filed a com-

plaint against California Consolidators, a trucking firm, alleging that Consolidators and Marathon Delivery Services (a pool car distributor and signatory to
a collective bargaining agreement with the union) constituted a single employer,
and requesting that the district court issue a declaratory judgment that Consolidators was bound by the terms of the agreement between the union and Marathon. 0 The district court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction and the union
appealed."
The Ninth Court decided that although "section 301 grants the district court
jurisdiction to decide whether employers constitute a single employer ...

it does

not extend to the determination of the second part of the issue, the appropriateness
of the bargaining unit."5 2 A positive finding on this second aspect, appropriateness
of the bargaining unit, would be required before a declaration could issue binding
Consolidators to the collective bargaining agreement between the union and Marathon. 3 If the complaint had requested only a declaration of single employer
status, this would have been within the lower court's jurisdication, but "[i]nstead
it sought relief that would require the court to decide the appropriateness of a
bargaining unit, a representational question reserved in the first instance to the
Board. ' 5 4 This is consistent with the distinction drawn by the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit in addressing the narrower issue of whether it is proper
for a federal court to review the merits of an NLRB decision on the appropriateness of a bargaining unit: "[T]he appropriate line between those cases where
the district court has jurisdiction under section 301 and those in which it does
not is to be determined by examining the major issues to be decided as to whether
'
they can be characterized as primarily representational or primarily contractual." 55
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 519.
41 Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local No. 70 v. California Consolidators, Inc., 693 F.2d 81 (9th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 932, (1983), reh'g denied, 469 U.S. 1066 (1984) [hereinafter cited
as Teamsters].
Id. at 81-82.
Id. at 82.
Id. at 83.
" Id.
Id.at 84.
" Local Union 204, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Iowa Electric Light &
Power Co., 668 F.2d 413, 419 (8th Cir. 1982).
41
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The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari to review the decision in
California Consolidators;6 however, Justice White dissented from the denial in
view of the direct conflict between the Ninth and Fifth Circuits: "Although the
conflict is now limited to two circuits, these circuits are very large circuits indeed,
and the issue will surely arise elsewhere. ' ' 1s He went on to note that the Eighth
Circuit also has "characterized the determination of an appropriate bargaining
unit as a representational question committed to the jurisdiction of the Board." 58
Justice White pinpointed the origin of the conflict between the circuits as the
product of divergent interpretations adopted by them of the Supreme Court decision in South Prairie Construction Co. v. Local 627, International Union
of OperatingEngineers,59 wherein a union appealed an NLRB determination that
two employers did not constitute a single employer and the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia agreed, set the Board's decision aside, and proceeded
to reach the question of whether the employees of the two companies were an
6
appropriate bargaining unit, an issue not previously addressed by the NLRB. 0
The Supreme Court held that the court of appeals should not have determined
this issue, because in so doing the court "did not give 'due observance to the
distribution of authority made by Congress as between its power to regulate commerce and the reviewing power which it has conferred upon the courts under
Article III of the Constitution.' -'61
In Justice White's view, the Ninth Circuit has interpreted this holding to
preclude the court from addressing "the appropriateness of a bargaining unit even
when the question has never been presented to the Board" because the parties
have proceeded directly into court seeking a determination of single employer
status in a controversy revolving around the contractual issue of the applicability
of the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement. 2 The Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit, on the other hand, has decided to treat appropriateness of
bargaining unit as a "collateral issue" which must be decided to resolve the large
breach of contract question, relying for support on decisions of the Supreme Court
"upholding the jurisdiction of federal courts under section 301 even in the face
of the Board's exclusive jurisdiction to consider allegations of unfair labor practices." 63 Thus Justice White dissented from the denial of certiorari because he
saw the need to resolve the conflict between the two courts of appeal and thereby

56 Teamsters, 469 U.S. 887, reh'g denied, 469 U.S. 1066 (1984).

,1Id. at 890 (White, J.,dissenting).
58Id.
S9 South Prairie Construction Co. v. Local 627, International Union of Operating Engineers,
425 U.S. 800 (1976).
60 Id. at 802-03.
61 Id.
at 806 (quoting FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 141 (1940)).
61 Teamsters, 469 U.S. at 880 (White, J., dissenting).
63 Id. at 889.
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"avert the wider conflict that will likely arise in the wake of these inconsistent
decisions.''

64

IV.

DisCUSSION

In A. T. Massey, the Fourth Circuit addressed the propriety of the West Virginia district court's grant of a preliminary injunction requiring the Massey companies to arbitrate the question of whether they were bound by the terms of the
1984 National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of which the Omar Mining
Company, a wholly-owned Massey subsidiary, was a signatory.65 The court of
appeals held that the district court had erred by overlooking the "necessity of
deciding the judicial question of whether agreement to arbitrate had, in fact, taken
place." 66 This holding was clearly correct in light of a line of Supreme Court
decisions, culminating in AT&T Technologies, stressing that "an obligation to
arbitrate is a matter of contract and the existence of such contract must be established before an arbitration can occur." 67
Proceeding to the issue of whether the Massey companies, other than Omar,
were obligated to arbitrate certain disputes in accordance with the provisions of
the 1984 NBCWA because Omar was a signatory to that agreement, the court
of appeals framed the question as "whether Omar was empowered to act as ' an
6
agent authorized to bind its parent and affiliates to an agreement to arbitrate.
In the court's view, ordinary agency principles controlled this question, not the
single employer doctrine "developed by the NLRB for other, if related, purposes. "69 On this basis, without indicating a reliance on either its own prior decisions or case law from other circuits, the court of appeals held that there was
no evidence indicating that Omar was an authorized agent of the Massey companies empowered to bind them to the agreement and, therefore, found "no
Omar, to negotiate
obligation on the part of Massey and its affiliates, other than
' 70
as a consequence of the provisions of the 1984 NBCWA. 1
In rejecting the applicability of the single employer doctrine advanced by the
union, the Fourth Circuit stressed the fact that Omar had remained a member
of the Bituminous Coal Operators Association, while the other Massey companies
had withdrawn, making it, in the court's view, "inconsistent to conclude that all
the subsidaries of Massey are merely puppets." 7 ' This observation of apparent

Id. at 890.

65A.T. Massey, 799 F.2d at 146; International Union, No. 2:86-0014, slip op. at 10.
A.T. Massey, 799 F.2d at 146.
67

Id.

" Id.

at 147.

69Id.
70 Id.

71Id.
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independence by Omar in choosing to be a party to both the negotiation and
execution of the 1984 NBCWA while its parent and affiliates did not participate,
also seems to be a significant, and perhaps determinative, factor in the court's
conclusion that Omar was not an authorized agent of the other Massey companies.
By deciding this case on ordinary principles of agency, the Fourth Circuit did
not foreclose a later application of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil to
the question of whether it may, in some circumstances, be appropriate to bind
a non-signatory corporation to a collective bargaining agreement entered into by
its subsidiary or affiliate. The court of appeals has chosen to disregard the corporate veil in situations arising outside the collective bargaining context, and it
does not seem unreasonable to think that in the appropriate factual situation in
which piercing the veil would prevent fraud or injustice, the court might apply
this doctrine in a labor relations case. 72
The district court in the West Virginia case decided that the Massey companies
consituted a single employer based on its factual findings that all four criteria
(interrelationship of operations, common management, centralized control of labor relations, common ownership or financial control) considered by the NLRB
in determining single employer status were present in the relationship of Massey
and its affiliated companies. 7a The court of appeals, in deciding that the single
employer doctrine was not controlling, noted that a finding that two or more
companies constitute a single employer "does not settle the issue of whether Massey and its subsidiaries, other than Omar, have agreed to arbitrate," 74 implicitly
recognizing that the analysis as developed by the NLRB would not permit the
Massey companies to be bound to the agreement between Omar and the union
without a further determination that the employees of the companies constituted
a single appropriate bargaining unit.
The A. T. Massey decision may be read in such a way as to infer from it
that the Fourth Circuit is in unspoken agreement with the Ninth Circuit in that
the appropriateness of a bargaining unit is not in the first instance subject to
judicial determination. The court clearly wanted a final resolution of the issue
of whether the Massey companies were bound to arbitrate under the provisions
of the 1984 NBCWA stating that by deciding the question, the court would "avoid
delay with respect to a matter which obviously is apt to reappear at a later date." 75
If the court had chosen to apply the single employer doctrine as advocated by
the union and agreed with the district court that the Massey companies constitute
a single employer, the court would not have been able to decide whether Massey
was bound by the contract if it adhered to the Ninth Circuit position that this

I

E.g., DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Fleming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 686-87 (4th

Cir. 1976).
13

74
71

InternationalUnion, No. 2:86-0014, slip op. at 9.
A.T. Massey, 799 F.2d at 147.
Id. at 146 n.4.
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determination was not within the court's jurisdiction under section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act. By relying instead on principles developed in
the law of agency, the court of appeals could avoid this potential impasse and
decide the case before it.
V.

CONCLUSION

Should the A. T. Massey decision be appealed, it seems likely that the applicability of the single employer doctrine by the federal courts in section 301 cases
concerning whether a non-signatory company to a collective bargaining agreement
may be bound by its affiliation with a signatory company will receive further
attention. In any event, the present conflict between the Fifth and Ninth circuits
in this area, and Justice White's express concern about the consequences of this
difference, indicate that at some point the Supreme Court will find it necessary
to clarify the law on this issue. As for the immediate impact of the A. T. Massey
case on law in the Fourth Circuit, it would seem that the court of appeals would
be reluctant to consider an argument by a party seeking to bind a non-signatory
to a collective bargaining agreement when framed in terms of the single employer
doctrine, especially as applied by the Fifth Circuit in Pratt-Farnsworth.It is important to note, however, that the court has by no means foreclosed arguments
on this issue based on the theory of disregarding the corporate form when presented in an appropriate factual situation.
Sara R. Simon
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